When agents like mobile robots make observations while carrying out a course of actions, a formalization of the observed information is needed in order to reason about it. When doing so in the situation calculus, a seemingly straightforward approach turns out to be inappropriate since it leads to unintended results and has an unfortunate sensitivity with respect to different forms of successor state axioms. In this paper we suggest how to properly encode observed information in order to avoid both of these problems.
Introduction
When agents like mobile robots make observations while carrying out a course of actions, this information is of use when reasoning about the future as in planning, but also when reasoning about the past, which is necessary, for example, when diagnosing execution failures. Here we are considering formalizing actions and observations in the situation calculus (McCarthy 1963; Levesque, Pirri, & Reiter 1998; Reiter & Pirri 1999) .
At first glance, it seems to be quite clear what knowledge observations provide the agent with, namely that a certain statement about the world is true at a given point during its course of actions. However, when we began extending Iwan's work on the diagnosis of plan execution failures (Iwan 2002) to the case that observations can be made during a course of actions, we realized that a seemingly straightforward formalization of the information provided by the observations may lead to unintended and/or unintuitive results when drawing conclusions from these observations. Moreover, in this case different forms of the so-called successor state axioms which describe the effect and non-effects of actions yield different results although switching between these different forms was thought to be innocuous. We will suggest how to properly formalize the information provided by observations in order to avoid both of these problems.
We will illustrate the problem and our solution by way of the following simple scenario. Suppose an autonomous robot is acting in a typical office environment with rooms R1 , R2 , R3 , . . . , Rm each of which is connected by a door to a hallway H . Starting from the hall in the initial situation, Copyright c 2002, American Association for Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
as the first action in a course of actions, the robot wants to enter room R1 and initiates navigating towards room R1 .
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But then, after arriving at the room, it finds out that it is not R1 . An reasonable diagnosis of this plan execution failure would be that the robot entered a room different from R1 . In order to figure out what actually happened it would be helpful to determine the rooms for which it was possible to enter them in the initial situation. Assume that it is possible to enter a room from the hall iff the door of the room is open. Let us consider three cases: 1. Suppose that nothing is known about the state of the doors in the initial situation except that the door of room R1 was open. Without any further information, one can only infer that it was possible to enter room R1 and that it was at best potentially possible to enter any other room. 2. If the robot is capable of inquiring about the state of the doors (e. g., from a door control system) it can obtain new information. For example, let the answer to the request be: rooms R1 , R2 , R3 are open, all other rooms are closed. From this information one should be able to infer that it was possible to enter rooms R2 , R3 instead of R1 , but no other room. 3. Instead of requesting the door states from an outside source, suppose the robot uses its own sensors and observes, for example, that it is in a room whose door is open. In a sense, this seems like a rather trivial observation because having just entered a room should already imply that the door to this room is open. Thus from this redundant observation one should not be able to infer more than in the case where no observation was made. As we will see below, there are surprisingly subtle issues that arise when attempting to formalize such scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly introduce the situation calculus, followed by a first attempt at formalizing and reasoning about observations using the robot example. In Section 4, we analyze the problems with this approach and discuss our solution. In Section 5, we look at the more general picture of projecting both forward and backward in time. Finally, we end the paper with a section on related work and a brief summary.
The Situation Calculus
In this section we briefly go over the situation-as-histories variant (Levesque, Pirri, & Reiter 1998; Reiter & Pirri 1999; Reiter 2001 ) of the situation calculus (McCarthy 1963; McCarthy & Hayes 1969) and, as we go along, give a formal account of our robot scenario in this framework. We adopt the convention that free variables are implicitly universally quantified unless otherwise stated. Φ x 1 , . . . , x n indicates that the free variables of formula Φ are among x 1 , . . . , x n .
The language of the situation calculus has three disjoint sorts: situation, action, object. There are two function symbols of sort situation: the constant S 0 , which denotes the initial situation, and the binary function symbol do, where do(α, σ) denotes the situation that is reached after executing action α in situation σ. There are several domain-independent foundational axioms which, among other things, characterize the predicate which denotes the predecessor relation between situations: s s means that s can be reached from s by a sequence of actions. The abbreviation s s stands for s s ∨ s = s. An action is a term A(t 1 , . . . , t n ), where A is a n-ary action function. The action functions used here are enter and leave for entering and leaving a room, open, close and lock for opening, closing and locking doors. In the example, the rooms and the hall are denoted by the object constants R1 , R2 , R3 , . . . , Rm and H . Properties of situations are represented using so-called fluents. Here we confine ourselves to relational fluents, which are predicates whose last argument is of sort situation, e. g., Locked (r, s), Open(r, s) and RoLoc(l, s), whose meaning is "The (door of) room r is locked in situation s", "The (door of) room r is open in situation s" and "The robot is at location l in situation s", respectively. For each fluent there is a successor state axiom of the form
which states under which condition, Φ F , the property F (x 1 , . . . , x n , ) holds in the successor situation do(a, s) of situation s after executing action a, e. g.,
Axioms describing the initial situation and situation independent facts form the initial database, e. g.,
unique names axioms for R1 , . . . , Rm and H Action precondition axioms of the form Poss(A(x 1 , . . . , x n ), s) ≡ Π A x 1 , . . . , x n , s are used to state under which condition, Π A , it is possible to execute action A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) in situation s, e. g.,
A situation is said to be executable if, starting in the initial situation, it is possible to execute all the actions that lead to the situation. Formally:
As discussed in detail in (Reiter 2001) , a basic action theory D describes the initial state of the world and how the world evolves under the effects of actions. It consists of foundational axioms for situations, unique names axioms for actions, an action precondition axiom for each action function, a successor state axiom for each fluent, and axioms describing the initial situation and situation independent facts.
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In what follows we also need the notion of situation-suppressed formulas, i. e., formulas where all occurrences of situation terms are "deleted" (details omitted). If φ is a situation-suppressed formula then φ σ denotes the situation calculus formula obtained after restoring suppressed situation arguments by "inserting" the situation σ where necessary, e. g., if
In contrast to the form of successor state axioms used above the form
is also found in the literature (e. g., in (Reiter 1991; Levesque et al. 1997; McIlraith 1998) ) and is in fact the "original" form from (Reiter 1991) . We refer to it as the Poss-guarded form, and it only allows to infer effects of executable actions. Note that the unguarded form is logically equivalent to the True-guarded form
Hence, from now on, we will write D True for basic action theory using the unguarded form (or the True-guarded form) and D Poss for basic action theory using the Possguarded form.
D True and D Poss are equivalent w. r. t. planning and projection for executable situations, strictly speaking projection into the future which means reasoning forward (in time) (cf. Section 5). But the example in the next section seems to suggest that they are not equivalent w. r. t. projection into the past, that is, reasoning backward in time. Worse yet, both forms suddenly seem inappropriate. However, Sections 4 and 5 will show how both problems can be avoided by accurately formalizing the information contained in observations.
The Robot Example Revisited
With the situation-calculus account of the robot example given in the previous section, let us now reconsider the situation where the robot planned to perform the action enter (R1 ) but fails. According to (Iwan 2002) , enter ( ) is a diagnosis of this plan execution failure for any ∈ {R2 , . . . , Rm} provided the executability of enter ( ) can be proved. Let φ be a situation-suppressed closed formula representing the observation that was made after performing the action enter ( ). Then φ do(enter ( ), S 0 ) is the additional information provided by this observation. Since we want to determine whether it was possible to enter room in the initial situation we consider the sets of rooms R ⊕ 1 (D, φ) and R 1 (D, φ) intended to be the sets of rooms different from R1 for which we are able to infer that it was possible or impossible to enter them respectively:
Note that, no matter which form of successor state axioms is used, Poss(enter ( ), S 0 ) ≡ Open( , S 0 ) can be inferred from the action precondition axiom for enter together with RoLoc(H , S 0 ). The three cases regarding the information about the door states can be represented as follows:
where φ N expresses that no observation was made, φ R corresponds to the case where the agent was told that only the first 3 rooms are open, and φ L corresponds to the case where the agent itself is able to figure out that the door to the room it just entered is open.
Let R ⊕ (φ) and R (φ) denote the intended results for an observation φ. The argument given in the introduction suggests the following values for R ⊕ (φ) and R (φ), respectively:
In a slight abuse of notation, we often write D ∧ Φ instead of D ∪ {Φ}.
However, depending on whether we use Poss-or Trueguarded successor state axioms, we sometimes get surprisingly different results as shown in the following table: 
Here we distinguish between the room = R1 which is assumed to be entered and the room ξ for which we are able to infer that it was possible or impossible to enter it. Determining the sets of rooms yields the same results except that (1.) for observation φ R , D Poss becomes even weaker since and (2.) for the other observation,
is "less counter-intuitive" but nevertheless strange because it is trivial that the robot can leave a room it just entered. Thus, the robot should not gain any information from the observation φ L after an enter -action. Let us consider the argument for D True and φ L in a bit more detail:
1. An effect of the execution of enter ( ) is that RoLoc(r) ≡ r = , i. e., the location of the robot is [by the (unguarded) successor state axiom for RoLoc]. So we have a kind of circular argument here: "An effect of the execution of enter ( ) is that . . . enter ( ) is executable." The crucial point in this circular argument is the first one which is considering effects of actions that are not known to be executable. This discovery leads us to a defect of the formalization of observed information so far: we consider observations made in situations which are not known to be executable. But this seems absurd: if we make an observation in some situation then we have reached this situation, and if we have reached some situation then the actions leading to this situation must have been executable. So it is revealed now that the intuition R ⊕ (φ L ) = ∅ was wrong if we assume that a room was entered. The right intuition should
. This is not the case. Rather there are models where ¬Open( , S 0 ) is true. Moreover, if ∈ {R4 , . . . , Rm} then D ∧ φ R do(enter ( ), S 0 ) |= ¬Open( , S 0 ). But this means that enter ( ) was not executable, contradicting the assumption that was entered. To resolve this problem, we need to be more careful in representing what observations really tell us.
What Observations Really Tell Us
We define an observation as a situation-suppressed closed formula. In order to obtain the information provided by an observation one has to restore an appropriate situation, namely the situation where the observation was made. When an agent, while carrying out a course of actions, makes several observations φ 1 , . . . , φ n in sequence the basic information contained in this sequence of observations is • For each observation φ i there is a situation s i where it was made.
• There is a situation s * which is the current situation and therefore is executable.
• The sequence s 1 , . . . , s n , s * provides us with a natural ordering of the situations. This is captured by the formula ∃ Ω[φ 1 , . . . , φ n ] where
Here s 1 s 2 ∧ · · · ∧ s n−1 s n ∧ s n s * is abbreviated by s 1 . . . s n s * . Note that, as a consequence of the foundational situation calculus axioms, s s * ∧ Exec(s * ) implies Exec(s).
The message then is that the sole information as given by the observation formulas is not enough to draw the right conclusions, but that we also need to take into account the history and, in particular, the fact that it is executable.
In the robot example, the basic information contained in φ L is no new information since D True and D Poss both imply ∃ Ω[φ L ]: they both imply σ 1 σ * ∧ Exec(σ * ) ∧ φ L σ 1 , e. g., with σ 1 = σ * = do(enter (R1 ), S 0 ). In general, the basic information may contain new information. However, mostly we have some additional assumptions about the action history. In the robot example, the assumption was s 1 = do(enter ( ), S 0 ) (with = R1 ). Let this formula be named Θ .
A history assumption for Ω[φ 1 , . . . , φ n ] can be expressed by a formula Θ s 1 , . . . , s n , s * (i. e., by a formula Θ with free variables among s 1 , . . . , s n , s * ) where s 1 , . . . , s n , s * are the variables chosen in Ω[φ 1 , . . . , φ n ]. The basic information together with the history assumption then is
We accordingly redefine the sets R ⊕ 2 (D, φ) and R 2 (D, φ) from the previous section:
(since the foundational situation calculus axioms imply
Therefore the φ R -results are only reported for ∈ {R2 , R3 } ( = R1 was presupposed):
So for each of the three observations both D True and D Poss give the intended results that were discussed at the end of the previous section (including the inconsistence for observation φ R if / ∈ {R2 , R3 }). Of course, in contrast to the previous section, here the primary statement that enter ( ) is executable in the initial situation is given additionally. This was not done in the previous section. But the absence of this premise was exactly the shortcoming of the formalization of observed information in the previous section. Note that the premise Poss(enter ( ), S 0 ) does not originate from the basic information contained in the observation but from the history assumption (together with the basic information).
The explicit distinction between the basic information contained in the observations on the one hand and the assumption about the history on the other hand is a valuable quality of the approach to observation information presented here.
Instead of explicitly introducing the entered room we could have used a modified history assumption
which is closer to what we wanted to express actually. Let this formula be named Θ ∃ and used within R ⊕ (D, φ) and R (D, φ) instead of Θ yielding:
The results now are:
So for each of the three observations both D True and D Poss
give what we expect to be the intended results as initially stated at the beginning of the previous section. Our robot example is a projection problem into the past where the form of successor state axioms does not matter. In the next section we will see that with our approach to observation information this is true in a rather general sense (correcting the impression that was given in Section 3).
Planning and Projection with Observations
In the last section, we used inferences like
where Θ is obtained from Θ by removing all ∃-quantifiers from the front of Θ (so Θ = ∃ Θ). Note though that ( ) is more general since Ψ may refer to the free variables of Ω[φ 1 , . . . , φ n ] ∧ Θ. This feature is needed, e. g., for general reachability, (re-)planning and projection problems. For instance, Θ ∃ is
and we can ask for properties of r, e. g., whether r is currently open which is obviously true (since the robot just entered r):
Note that this could not be inferred if Θ ∃ would not contain s * = s 1 . Likewise, if we would like to know whether it is possible to recover from error in our robot example we have to check whether the original goal of the robot can be reached from the current situation. This is a reachability problem. Its general form is
where s * is the variable referring to the current situation in
(Re-)Planning means: Find an action sequence α 1 , . . . , α m and check that it is executable in the current situation and achieves the goal? 5 The general form therefore is with
Projection into the future means: Does a given action sequence α 1 , . . . , α m achieve the goal if it is performed in the current situation? So it refers to the given future situation σ and asks whether a certain property (the goal) will hold in σ . Projection into the past instead refers to a given past situation σ (S 0 in our robot example) and asks whether a certain property (the goal) held in σ . The general form for projection is
Note that plan checking (i. e., checking whether an action sequence is a plan) and reachability testing can be viewed as special cases of projection. If σ is not a bygone situation, i. e., D |= ∀ [(Ω[φ 1 , . . . , φ n ] ∧ Θ) ⊃ σ s * ], then projection is hypothetical reasoning. Since they refer to future situations, plan checking and reachability testing are hypothetical reasoning, too.
If there are no observations (i. e.: n = 0) and the current situation is the initial situation (i. e.: Θ simply is s * = S 0 ) then any occurrence of s * in Γ can be replaced by S 0 and reachability, planning and projection (into the future) reduce to their standard forms
with σ = do(α m , . . . do(α 1 , S 0 ) . . . ) for variable-free actions α 1 , . . . , α m . Note that the standard forms are hypothetical reasoning (since the foundational situation calculus axioms imply ¬(σ S 0 )). Of course, the given general forms do not automatically guarantee that the form of the successor state axioms does not matter. For instance, if
(cf. Section 3). The crucial point here is that nothing is known about the executability of do(enter ( ), S 0 ). If do(enter ( ), S 0 ) were claimed to be executable, either directly, e. g., by Exec(do(enter ( ), S 0 )) or Poss(enter ( ), S 0 ), or indirectly, e. g., by do(enter ( ), S 0 ) = s 1 or do(enter ( ), S 0 ) s * , both D True and D Poss would give the same answer. For example, if instead of Θ we use
An appropriate definition of claimed executable would give us the following theorem:
If all situations are claimed executable within Ω[. . . ], Θ and Ψ then
It is a topic under investigation to formulate a precise (yet as comprehensive as possible) syntactic criterion for "all situations are claimed executable within . . . ." However, reasonable formula are likely to comply with this condition as can be seen from the following considerations. For reachability and planning, s and σ are explicitly claimed executable by Exec(s) and Exec(σ ) respectively.
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Since reasoning about non-executable actions does not make much sense, for projection into the future Θ should contain Exec(σ ), i. e., we assume that the action sequence α 1 , . . . , α m is executable in the current situation. Likewise, for projection into the past it is safe to have σ s * contained in Θ as the previous situation σ lies before the current situation s * . Also, if the history assumption Θ mentions previous situations it can contain σ s * for each of these situations σ. Yet, Θ may also refer to the future, e. g., if we assume that the current situation is so that after performing some actions α 1 , . . . , α k a situation will be reached which has some property ψ, i. e., Θ contains ψ do(α k , . . . do(α 1 , s * ) . . . ) . But if we think that we are able to reach do(α m , . . . do(α 1 , s * ) . . . ) then Exec(do(α m , . . . do(α 1 , s * ) . . . )) should be contained in Θ, too. Similar considerations can be made for situations in Γ(s). However, often s will be the only situations mentioned in Γ(s) in which case no problem arises from Γ(s).
Related Work
As we already remarked at the beginning of this paper, this work grew out of Iwan's investigations into diagnosing plan execution failures (Iwan 2002) . There, as well as in McIlraith's earlier work on diagnosis (McIlraith 1998), observations similar to those used in this paper, play a central role. Although we make no commitment as to how observations come about, they are often a result of sensing actions performed by the agent. Sensing in the framework of the situation calculus is considered, for example, in (De Giacomo & Levesque 1999a; 1999b (McIlraith & Scherl 2000) . However, they are mainly concerned with knowledge, ramifications, and the notion of tests, issues which are orthogonal to those addressed in this paper.
There are also interesting connections between observations and narratives. Just as narratives talk about what actually happened in the past, so do observations. 7 Narratives were formalized in the situation calculus in (Pinto 1998; Miller & Shanahan 1994) . 8 We remark that the models of time considered in these approaches can easily be added to our framework as well. An interesting approach to modeling narratives in an action language different from the situation calculus is discussed in (Baral, Gelfond, & Provetti 1997) . There the language L 1 is proposed, which extends the language A (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1992; 1993) by adding the notions of actually occurring actions and observations to capture narratives. In the remainder of this section, we take a closer look at this work.
To start with, L 1 is a propositional language, just like A. The constants S i that are used to denote actual situations (in contrast to hypothetical situations) roughly correspond to our situation variables s i in Ω ∧ Θ. The causal laws (A causes F if ψ) correspond to effect axioms ∀s [ψ s ⊃ F (do(A, s))] in the situation calculus and can be encoded by successor state axioms (cf. (Reiter 1991) ; the necessary completeness assumption is also part of the semantics of L 1 ). Observations are expressed by fluent facts (φ at S i ) which correspond to φ s i ; precedence facts (S j precedes S i ) correspond to s j s i ; occurrence facts (A occurs at S i ) translate to do(A, s i ) s * ; and hypotheses (φ after [A 1 , . . . , A n ] at S i ) correspond to φ do(A n , . . . do (A 1 , s i ) . . . ) . Domain descriptions are collections of laws and facts and can be translated into successor state axioms (laws) and an observations-plushistory-assumption formula Ω ∧ Θ (facts). L 1 has no notion of executability of actions, which means that ∀s [Poss(A, s) ≡ True] for all actions A. Therefore, of course, problems regarding Poss-or True-guarded laws do not arise in L 1 at all. (There are extensions of L 1 containing executability conditions, e. g., in (Baral, McIlraith, & Son 2000) where, applying our terminology, the causal laws are True-guarded.) The semantics of L 1 imposes a minimality condition on the occurrence of actions leading to the current situation. It is an interesting question whether and how the same minimality property can be achieved within the situation calculus. Then L 1 may be emulated in the situation calculus using our approach to observations with history assumptions.
Summary
Our concern has been to answer the question "What do observations really tell us?" This question arose from examples where an unsophisticated formalization within the situation calculus led to unintended and unintuitive results when drawing conclusions and where the use of either unguarded or Poss-guarded successor state axioms unwantedly yields different results. So there was the need for a closer look on how to formalize information provided by observations. We found that the information can (and should) be divided into the basic information which only reflects the sequence of observations (up to the current situation) and an assumption about the history (including the current situation and possibly assumption about potential future evolutions). With this formalization at hand, we revised the general form of planning and projection (now into the future and into the past) in the presence of observations and argued that unguarded and Poss-guarded successor state axioms will behave equivalently.
